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SECULARISATION AND CHURCH- STATE RELATIONS: TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY

Secularity, as a socio-political condition, and consequently secularisation, as a process, are crucial concepts in the discussion on the relationship between Church and State. Politologists, sociologists, theologians, journalists and politicians, clergy and lay people, dispute about secularisation, its pros and cons, and the benefits and disadvantages of living in “a secular age”. “What does it mean to say that we live in a secular age? Almost everyone would agree that in some sense we do (...)” (Taylor, 2007, p. 1). Taylor’s statement signals that “secularization” has become a more and more popular term whose meaning encompasses an indeterminate range of subtle variations and inflections. Given the popularity of the concept, what does “secularization” really mean?

What is the difference between secularity and secularism? Secularity is a description of individual orientation and secularism is a description of society (Barker, 2007, p. iii). Taylor holds that secularisation and secularity “are phenomena which exist today well beyond the boundaries of this [Western – A. L.] world” (Taylor, 2007, p. 21). A reservation should be made that the interest of this article does not extend beyond the “West”, specifically not beyond “Latin Christendom”; the article focuses on the use of the term in Western Europe. The word is often

used in ways that obscure its meaning and the context in which it may properly be applied. That said, perhaps secularisation is so wide a concept that it may be used according to need. If so, the term is insufficient to encompass all the socio-political transitions under way. It may be necessary to introduce one or more qualifying prefixes or suffixes in order to differentiate patterns of the political and social changes that are commonly labelled “secularisation”. Accordingly, this article investigates two inter-related issues: firstly, whether the phenomenon of secularisation is sufficiently diverse as to justify a typology; secondly, if in the affirmative, what to label the different patterns. To begin, it is necessary to review the numerous definitions “secularisation” coined or employed by scholars. “Proceed at your own risk” – Casanova’s warning may apply to this exercise, bearing in mind that there are so many definitions that this term’s ambiguity may mean that it should no longer be used without qualification.

EXPLORING THE MEANING OF “SECULARISATION”

Paradoxically, the term secularisation is not “secular” at all; it is rooted in Christianity; it assumes that the religious domain also exists (Brague, 2007, p. 5). This Christian origin is even more evident in the term “laicisation”. The layman is a servant of God, who is promised eternal life. Etymologically secularisation comes from the Latin *saecularis* which originally meant “century”, “age” or “world” and has nothing to suggest that it is specifically applied in relation to religion.

Casanova himself mentions two approaches to secularisation. The first one, presented by the minority of scholars (e.g. Wilson and Dobbelaere) focuses on the term’s explanatory value, which can be used to give reasons for modern historical processes. The second one (represented among others by Martin and Greeley) adduces empirical backgrounds of the theory of secularisation (Casanova, 1994, p. 11).

Burgoński presents a shortlist of characteristics of the term:

1. A gradual decline of religion in the public sphere (e.g. frequency, influence and so on);
2. Social adaptation – pragmatism wins, people are more focused on their daily lives than on religion;
3. Withdrawal of religion to the private sphere – religion loses its influence upon institutions and society;
4. Structural differentiation – secular domain separates itself from reli-

gious institutions and norms. For instance, the spheres of education and welfare are taken over by the State.

5. Process of transforming what was religious into what is not religious. Religious legitimisation is replaced by secular legitimisation.
6. Process leading to the desacralisation of the world (including humanity and nature). Rationalism, empiricism and scepticism appear as a category of perception of the world. The world becomes “disenchanted”, losing the element of “enchantment”;
7. Transition from the “sacral” society to the “secular” society, where decisions are based on a supposedly objective “rationality” (Burgoński, 2014, p. 444-445).

Another meaning of the term brings us to the Reformation and religious wars, when elements of the Church’s properties and goods were appropriated by the state. That explanation of secularisation seems to have the closest connotation with the contemporary understanding of the word. As noted by Casanova, it has its justification if the religious and the secular are distinguished (Casanova, 1994, p. 20).

Wilson formulated one of the most common definitions of secularisation describing it as “a process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance” (Wilson, 2016, p. 6). Mazurkiewicz adds to the definition adjectives like “temporal”, “of the worldly, passing, pagan and sinful” (Mazurkiewicz, 2004, p. 1183). It is, therefore, a rupture with “sacrum” – with that which is holy and other-worldly. Such a definition of secularisation could convey the impression that everything that is secular is generally bad. This optic may change, staying at the same time within the Catholic understanding of secularisation, if the incarnation of Jesus Christ is interpreted as an example of secularisation – then the whole of Christianity would be based, in a certain sense, on that process. According to Peter L. Berger, secularisation is “the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from domination of religious institutions and symbols” (Berger, 2011, p. 107). In Western Europe, it “manifests itself in the evacuation by the Christian Churches of areas previously under their control or influence – as in the separation of church and state, or in the expropriation of church lands, or in the emancipation of education from ecclesiastical authority” (ibidem).

Three other approaches to the original understanding of secularisation may be distinguished. Mazurkiewicz provides an example of secularisation as signifying the transfer of priests from a religious order to the diocesan clergy under the bishop’s direct supervision (Mazurkiewicz, 2004, p. 1183). This is in fact the original meaning of the term (Pollack, 2015, p. 65). Similarly, Kosmin distinguish-

es between secular priests (those who work in local parishes) and religious priests (who take vows of poverty and live in monastic communities) (Kosmin, 2007, p. 2). In turn, according to Urner, secularisation should be applied to describe religious who, after taking vows, live for some time in the outside world (Turner, 2011, p. 128) (without the negative aspect of “giving up”). ForCox, who also represents this approach, the origins of the term secularisation refer to the transfer of a “religious” priest to parish responsibility (Cox, 2013, p. 24). The last approach seems to be the least persuasive as some parishes are run by religious communities, while the first two approaches do not differ much from each other.

There are also differing views regarding the first time the term was used. In the literature mentioned above it was introduced in the 1950s; however, it could have been the historian W. E. H. Lecky, who in 1865 used the term secularisation in the context of “replacing religious considerations in relations between states and decisions to go to war” (McLeod, 2000, p. XII). According to Mazurkiewicz, secularisation was used for the first time during the French revolution in its political context as a process of releasing an object, territory or institution from the power of, and dependence on, the Church (Mazurkiewicz, 2004, p. 1183). However, this was an age when secularisation was more connected with social change, not with intellectual “advance” (McLeod, 2000, p. 2). In turn, the term “secularity” was probably used for the first time in 1846 by George Holyoake when the first pro-secular organisation was founded in the United Kingdom – the British National Secular Society (Turner, 2011, p. 129). Secularity meant “any social order which was separate from religion without engaging in any direct criticism of religious belief” (ibidem, p. 129–130) Thus, there are two approaches to the term: the first approach is neutral whilst the second is descriptive and ideological. The latter leads to secularisation understood as a political programme. Secularity, and consequently secularisation, as a process, are the crucial terms in relations between Church and State but it is still not clear what they really mean (Casanova, 1994, p. 14).

Rundell says that Taylor’s definition of secularisation “stands at the heart of the formation of the modern public sphere, and is more troubling for him [Taylor – A. L.] than the economic imaginary” (Rundell, 2014, p. 202). Taylor distinguishes three meanings of secularity. The first refers to secularized public spaces, such as common institutions and practices of the State (Taylor, 2007, p. 1). God might be present at every level of political and social activity. Taylor gives the example of parishes which were centres of local community life. “In those societies you couldn’t engage in any kind of public activity without encountering God: in the above sense. But the situation is totally different today” (ibidem, p. 2). Is it?

Have those societies become extinct? Have they all become, let us use this word, secularised to such an extent? Although Taylor focuses primarily on secularity instead of secularisation, his message is clear: it is secularisation which leads to what was mentioned above – to secularity. The second meaning of secularity encompasses the decline of belief and religious practice (*ibidem*, p. 4). Finally, the third one refers to the “conditions of belief”.

It is impossible not to agree with Taylor who says that these two words “secularity” and “secularisation” are nowadays phenomena experienced across the Latin civilization, though not only there. The 18th century Enlightenment was in fact the beginning of secularisation in Church-State relations. Reason took precedent over religion (Burgoński, 2014, p. 437). Mazurkiewicz posits the Enlightenment not as secularisation but rather as an attempt at creating a secular religion – a state religion where God has been replaced by “natural morality” (Mazurkiewicz, *in print*). One of the main propositions of the Enlightenment was that the world can be understood with the help of the mind alone, while religions are not needed any more. The idea of progress became the supreme value. Consequently, rationalism took over the sphere once reserved for religion. As pointed out by Benedict XVI, “unlike other great religions, Christianity has never proposed a revealed law to the State and to society, that is to say a juridical order derived from revelation. Instead, it has pointed to nature and reason as the true sources of law – and to the harmony of objective and subjective reason, which naturally presupposes that both spheres are rooted in the creative reason of God” (Benedict XVI, 2011a).

Mazurkiewicz also presents two meanings of secularisation – positive and negative – but he puts the accent on slightly different elements than Taylor. The positive meaning of the term rests on the autonomous development of religion and, thanks to that, of culture. The negative one is a metaphor which describes the erosion of morality (Mazurkiewicz, 2004, p. 1183).

Probably one of the most complex definitions of secularisation is given by Mariański, who admits that secularisation is “a term not having an explicit definition” (Mariański, 2001, p. 185) and identifies five main meanings of secularisation:

1. Collapse or disappearance of religion – religious and church institutions lose their influence on society. The final stage of the process is a non-religious society;
2. Adaptation to the world – it applies to a religious group founded on transcendent rules which then loses its distinction over time;
3. Desacralisation of the world. Going-away from the religious-magical

understanding of the world for logical-causal explanation of different phenomena (Weber's "Disenchantment of the World");

4. Disconnection of society from religion which then remains only an element of the private life and personal life of a human being (privatisation of religion);
5. Penetration of religious content into secular life – when religious patterns of thinking are detached from their context and become a part of general culture (secularisation of theological categories and terms) (ibidem).

However defined, secularisation is commonly assigned *a priori* a negative connotation, and usually signals conflict between State and Church, although Mariański underlines the term's neutrality in social sciences; in itself secularisation is not against Church. Besides our linguistic skirmishes with secularisation we should remember that it is also "a process on the cultural level which is parallel to the political one" (Cox, 2013, p. 24). In turn, Voegelin connects secularisation strictly with Christianity; it is "the attitude in which history, including the Christian religious phenomena, is conceived as an inner worldly chain of human events, while, at the same time, there is retained the Christian belief in a universal, meaningful order of human history" (Voegelin, 1975, p. 7). Burgoński dates the theory of secularisation to the 1960's. Though his analysis refers to "theories of secularisation" (Burgoński, 2014, p. 446) by "theories" Burgoński means attempts at formulating an explanation of the process of secularisation. In turn, the paradigm of secularisation is inextricably connected with the theory – it is the way we see reality in the context of secularisation. After many centuries of preeminence, Christianity's position has been evolving from playmaker to defender. The Church has ceased playing the role of "explaining the world". The ecclesiastical monopoly has been replaced by a pluralism of world-views where Church and Christianity have to compete with other organisations, ideas and lifestyles which often stand in opposition to the Christian world-view. Taylor's conclusion leaves no illusion: "Belief in God is no longer axiomatic. There are alternatives. It may be hard to sustain one's faith" (Taylor, 2007, p. 2). That pluralism is deep-rooted in modernization, which remains the central issue of the theories of secularisation (Pollack, 2015, p. 65).

One of the most important theories of secularisation is so-called "privatisation of religion". It means that religion is being moved from the public sphere to the private sphere. The term can be also understood as relativisation of religion – people remain religious but pick only those elements which suit them. Some

scholars say that privatisation of religion is connected with religious values taking root in lay institutions. Then, the process of privatisation of religion would not have only negative consequences (Taylor, 2007, p. 451).

The opposite to “privatisation of religion” is “deprivatisation of religion”. According to that concept, religion which first became privatised, in appropriately conducive circumstances can enter the public or political sphere again. It is possible for religion to exist publicly in a modern society. The base for that could be the State, political society or civil society. Casanova, author of the theory, does not see any contradiction between privatisation of religion and its deprivatisation. It may be inferred, then, that privatisation of religion, at least in the case of Christianity, can be reversible (*ibidem*).

The foregoing theories also infer that secularisation is not necessarily inextricably connected with desacralisation. These two processes can drive each other but also can develop independently of each other.

An interesting approach is made by Hugh MacLeod; to avoid the unsettling differences regarding secularisation, he introduces four different understandings of the term: “1. The march of science, 2. Modernisation, 3. Postmodernity, 4 Selling God” (McLeod, 2000, p. 5). After all, it is easy to agree with Lucian Hölscher saying that “there is no point in pursuing this line of argument any longer, no hope of finally coming to a conclusive and comprehensive model of secularisation which does justice to all major aspects of religious change in modern societies” (Hölscher, 2010, p. 197). Over the last fifty years the term has become controversial. We have found ourselves, using his words, in a kind of deadlock. Moreover, it seems that everyone, both those who welcome the process of secularisation as well as those who deplore the situation, accept the fact that the world has become irreligious. McLeod confirms that, in spite of some exceptions, the secularisation thesis in the 1960s and 1970s seemed to have the status of sociological orthodoxy. However, the situation started to change in the 1980s. The reason lay in the increasing role of the churches in Central and Eastern Europe, the emergence of militant Islam as well as of evangelical groups in the United States (McLeod, 2000, p. 3).

Over the years, the meaning of the term evolved and the discussion about secularisation has shifted focus onto the theories of secularisation. Pollack asks important questions: “Do processes of secularization begin with the age of industrialization or in the Enlightenment, during the Reformation or already during the Renaissance or even during the Investiture Controversy in the Middle Ages?” (Pollack, 2015, p. 68). It is not easy to answer them as there are advocates as well as opponents of the “Golden Age of Faith”, which, according to Pollack, is a myth (*ibidem*).

According to contemporary sociologists, in the 1960s religion was disappearing from public life in the Western world. That approach changed when they started to realise that it was not disappearing but just diminishing in its importance. The global change of society affects the process of secularization; it was the same independently of the cultural context. The 1970's yielded a turn in the perception of secularisation as a less universal process, but more internally diverse (Burgoński, 2014, p. 446). Burgoński recalls that in the 1980's the discussion about secularisation intensified. (ibidem, p. 463). The scholars did not invent any new approach but simply observed the generic trend. However, it led to formulating the market theory of religion. As a contradiction to that, the 1990's brought the thesis about the fall of the secular paradigm (ibidem, p. 447). The field of sociology of religion was enriched by new theories of secularisation reviewed above.

In the light of the above, we may distinguish three broad understandings of secularisation:

1. Secularisation as a matter of internal Church organisation;
2. Secularisation as a socio-political transition associated with Enlightenment views about rationality and the rise of a secular "religion";
3. Secularisation as a description of the place of religious belief and religious organisation in contemporary society, including politics and the State.

The third of them seems to be crucial from the point of view of this article and is analysed below. That kind of confusion with regards to the term "secularisation" may have been caused by different concepts of secularisation within the Church, which were not consistent with each other: Caesaropapism, conciliarism, the Jesuit understanding of the state, the Dominican understanding of the Church, and so on (Loughlin, 2014). One may ask why another concept is needed. Is not the distinction between secularisation and desecralisation enough? (Mazurkiewicz, 2014, p. 1184). Mazurkiewicz, characterizing desecralisation in terms of Daniel Bell, offers this description: "New cult religiosity puts the emphasis on personal experience and personal faith which is not related to the past. It craves for ritual and myth; emphasizing magic rather than theology, personal bond with a guru or with a group, not with an institution or with a faith" (ibidem, p. 1185). Bilimoria uses the term "pseudo-secularisation" but in the context of secularisation in India (2014, p. 29). These are not instances of semi-secularisation: in the case of "Latin Christendom" greater specificity is needed and the introduction of a new term seems to be essential.

In the light of the above, among all the definitions of secularisation reviewed here, it may be argued that the term cannot meaningfully encompass the range of social, cultural, political and institutional processes with which scholars have associated it. To apply the term “secularisation” without qualification is to imply that both the phenomenon and the process are undifferentiated and unvarying, an implication that the evidence clearly contradicts. The on-going debate about the meaning of secularisation, and the controversy about its value to sociology suggest the need to distinguish different patterns within the paradigm and thus to create a typology. This in turn raises questions about the criteria for classifying the range of phenomena associated with secularisation, as well as the designation to be applied to each pattern in the typology. It is to these matters that the article now turns.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS SECULARISATION AND SECULARISM

The falling rate of religious practice is commonly accepted as an important indicator of secularisation. According to The European Values Study for 1999/2000 recalled by Smith, as many as 77% of the European population declared that they believed in God (2008, p. 51) and just 5% (*ibidem*, p. 14-15) that they were atheists. The highest proportion of atheists was in France – 15%, (*ibidem*, p. 15) the lowest in countries like Great Britain, Austria, Italy, Greece, Finland and Russia – 5% or even less (*ibidem*). Is Smith right in saying that “secularism is not the end of Christianity, nor is it a sign of the godless nature of the West but rather [...] the latest expression of the Christian religion?” (2008, p. 2). Secularisation leads to secularism. What, then, is secularism? Smith’s answer to this might seem surprising: “Secularism is Christian ethics shorn of its doctrine. It is the ongoing commitment to do good, understood in traditional Christian terms, without a concern for the technicalities of the teachings of the Church. Instead the desire to be and do good is supported by a sympathetic feeling towards the idea of God” (*ibidem*). In this understanding secularisation does not have a negative, anti-religious and anti-Christian connotation. Smith argues that although people do not speak about Christianity, they still can, on the whole, be charitable; they still can be generous and caring (*ibidem*).

Cook’s statement may seem to be even more controversial: “Secularism in the West is a new manifestation of Christianity, but one that is not immediately obvious because it lacks the usual scaffolding we associate with the Christian religion” (*ibidem*). Secularism as a new manifestation of Christianity: does it make sense or is it just a kind of utopian vision? To avoid such confusions, it may

simply be necessary to coin a new term which would differ from secularisation and which would explain processes occurring in some European countries.

Arguably, the genesis of the current understanding of secularisation is directly connected with the past. That distinction between secularism and secularisation is also visible in the approach adopted by Benedict XVI who appreciated the process of secularisation, noting that “periods of secularisation [...] have contributed significantly to her [the Church’s – A. L.] purification and inner reform” (Benedict XVI, 2011b). Benedict connected secularising trends with “a profound liberation of the Church from forms of worldliness, for in the process she as it were sets aside her worldly wealth and once again completely embraces her worldly poverty” (ibidem). Similarly, former Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, states that there are two types of secularism: the programmatic one and the procedural one. In programmatic secularism the government seeks to promote a social climate in which public religious connection is centrally outlawed. In such a situation, private religious connections may not be added to public debate, while public manifestation of these connections becomes an offence against democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, in procedural secularism the government never commits itself to support any religion but nonetheless welcomes religious connection in the public sphere (Williams, 2016). The genesis of the concept of procedural secularisation may be found in the concept of religious tolerance in Poland introduced by the Warsaw Confederation in 1573 (*The Confederation of Warsaw*).

According to Williams there is no serious reason to panic about secularism, which probably is a prodigal child of the Church and its theology. “Like every prodigal child” – Williams explains – [secularism – A.L.] “is capable to doing some startling things, being hostile to its parent. But if Church and other religious communities are going to think through the implications of civic identity and religious, it may produce a fruitful and constructive conversation with the political institutions of our day” (Williams, 2016).

SELECTED HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF SECULARISATION AND ITS EFFECT ON RELATIONS BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE

Due to the complexity of the analysed topic, we will focus only on selected aspects of secularisation over the centuries. Its origins are, however, much older. In the distant past, the power of the emperor of Byzantium did not depend on the pope but on the patriarch who lived in the same city. In Byzantium there was no real differentiation between sacralisation of the clergy and sacralisation of

monarchs. For instance, the emperor of Byzantine Greeks was given the title “the thirteenth apostle” (Mazurkiewicz, 2001, p. 267). On the other hand, imperial law was often in opposition to canon law. That caused conflicts and frictions. Brague gives a vivid example by opposing Christians to Muslims. Christians were not allowed to form an official “Christian army” in the way that Muslims were, whose soldiers were promised to get to paradise. It went even further; a Christian soldier who killed someone could be refused the sacraments (Brague, 2007, p. 131).

The situation was very different in Latin Europe. Permanent threat of barbarian invasions led to the creation of a system which would be able to defend the Roman state and bishops. Brague concludes that the bishop became a temporal sovereign, responsible for such common social goods as education or public health (ibidem, p. 132). The role of the papacy had been changing over the years. Before achieving a dominant role in politics, the pope found himself under the protection of the German emperor (Otto I) or, even earlier, the French king (Charlemagne) whom he crowned the first Holy Roman Emperor. The common view of the papacy from a well-known TV series, such as *The Borgias*, does not capture the whole perspective of the position of the papacy. It should be remembered that for many years it was limited strictly to the religious sphere; one could say that the role of the pope with regards to European emperors was somehow ministerial. Over the years the papal position was strengthened. The power of the Church was distributed through three connected elements: the pope → ecclesiastical institutions → temporal power. Thus, it created many conflicts. The cathedral schools and universities which were founded, eventually formed a kind of network which could impinge on the emperor. Brague describes the situation in Rome as “recycling” and quotes a French canonist, Gilles de Bellemere: “As for the thing itself in its true state, the Roman empire (*imperium*) is today in the hands of the Roman Church. But as for the way in which people commonly speak of it, it still remains in the hands of the Emperor” (ibidem, p. 134). It is true but can it be said that the Emperor was secular when he and consequently his laws were anointed by God’s Vicar on earth?

In fact, nothing was “secular”; everyone and everything was associated with God and incorporated into the divine economy of salvation. For instance, Pope Sylvester II chose his papal name which differed from that received at baptism. It opened a new era in the history of the papacy, in which the pope meant more than “just” a Vicar of Christ. The pope had become an independent player on the political scene, though this was not entirely problematic. Thanks to this development the papacy acquired the ability to create a modern structure of Church, with dioceses directly attached to Rome and without an imposed

Germanisation upon the nations which accepted baptism. Over a hundred years later the situation developed until there arose a pope whose way of ruling did not differ much from that of an emperor. The twenty-seven theses issued by Gregory XVII gave rise to a chronic conflict between popes and emperors. It is not difficult to agree with Berman for whom the so-called “papal Revolution” should not be linked only with the Investiture Struggle but also, and among others, with the “enhancement of the secular, political and legal authority of emperors, kings and lords” (Berman, 1983, p. 520). This is naturally true; however, that enhancement was circumscribed by the papal power. The Concordat of Worms signed in 1122 by Pope Calixtus II legitimized the Church as a political organisation. Berman seems to confirm this reflection, noting that the Papal Revolution “brought into being [...] political entities without ecclesiastical functions and non-ecclesiastical legal orders” (ibidem, p. 273). Naturally it does not refer to the Church itself, but the consolidation of papal power meant that all the Western European secular states at the end of the day were supposed to be fully dependent on the Pope. So called “secular law” emulated canon law because the latter “was more highly developed and was available for imitation” (ibidem, p. 274). The rules of these secular states were not secular at all, as they were fully aware that their authority came from God (Morris, 1991, p. 553–554). Loughlin confirms that one of the two main positions within state tradition is the position of the Catholic papacy – a “supranational type of political organisation” (Loughlin, 2014). In turn, nationalism is related to the Protestant tradition with its national churches. It is difficult not to agree with Loughlin who recognises the persistence and effects of that division in the European Union – the member states having a Catholic majority are strongly in favour of European integration. In turn the Northern, Protestant countries are the most Eurosceptical (ibidem). It should not be a surprise if we remember that the fathers of European integration: Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi, Konrad Adenauer, were Christian Democrats. In turn the founders of Christian personalism, such as Jacques Maritain, Emmanuel Mounier, Alexandre Marc, were in one stream of European federalism which went beyond the nation state (ibidem). The Loughlin statement finds its confirmation in the research conducted by Scherer (Scherer, 2015, p. 893–909). What may also be worth noting is that none of the popes in the era of European integration, starting from Pius XII, adopted a Euro-sceptic stance (Mudrov, 2015, p. 507–528).

It may be concluded that it was the pope who, to a certain degree, “secularised” the Church; in this meaning secularisation would be granting political rights (and, what is even more important, political control), to the Church. Brague says that “the bishops had become the ecclesiastical version of the nobility and

had often been chosen from among the younger sons of the sovereigns” (Brague, 2007, p. 135). One can say that the Church acquired many of the attributes of the state, to be more specific: of the monarchy (not yet an absolutist one, however) (Morris, 1991, p. 213). The “secularising” of the Church conferred some attributes of the secular state itself. The introduction of celibacy, without deliberating on its spiritual effect, was mainly caused by the willingness to end conflicts about investiture. In this way, the pope became a defender of the *libertas Ecclesiae* which means that he was guarding the integrity of the Church – an attribute given by Christ. The emperor, in turn, was not devoid of responsibility for the *libertas Ecclesiae*. In that plural meaning we mean the status of local churches – an “attribute” or more precisely a guarantee granted by local sovereigns.

Brague brings this idea that Christianity in itself is a reason of secularisation and seems to confirm the hypothesis about the incarnation of Jesus Christ as a kind of first “secularisation” (Brague, 2007, p. 136). The Church, by using the sphere of justice, forced the State to work as an institution, independent from the Church which was much different than it currently is. Of course, in the Middle Ages there were no Church-State relations, or, to use different words, Church-State relations meant something completely different from what they do nowadays. Instead, there were relations between the papacy and the empire. These were nothing else but “sub-relations”, internal relations within the Church. Two godly laws locked in endless rivalry coexisted. The first one was the Divine Right of Kings and the second one was Sacrality. Nothing was secular, everything was sacred. As pointed out by Gauderault-DesBiens and Karazivan, before the Reformation “the Church and political power had been united, forming »political universum«, a term used by Carl Schmidt (Gauderault-DesBiens, Karazivan, 2012, p. 93). That “political universum” was a reality in which everyone and everything depends on God.

What was the position of a king then? It is interesting that the Polish name of Charlemagne (Charles the Great) is Karol Wielki. The Polish term for “king” (król) comes directly from Charles the Great (Karol Wielki): Karol (Charles) → król (a king). This small linguistic example shows the significance of Charlemagne and the symbolic power of his name, which defined kingship in several Slavic languages. The position of the Pope was irrefutable; however, the king was not only a Christian: above all he was a reflection of Christ (Brague, 2007, p. 137).

There are two approaches to relations between the pope and the emperor¹. Caesaropapism on the one hand and the theory of the direct authority of the

1 The relations between the pope and the emperor were in fact the prototype for relations between Church and State.

church in the temporal order, which eventually became the papal theocracy, on the other (Mazurkiewicz, 2001, p. 264). It is noteworthy to mention the significance of *Dictatus papae* – 27 statements by Gregory VII – which secularised state authorities across Europe as the pope took over the responsibility over people’s souls. The reform, continued by Innocent III, Innocent IV and Boniface VIII, led to granting the pope the prerogative to excommunicate rulers (Mazurkiewicz, 2001, p. 264). The reason was that the Pope spoke out against attributing supernatural abilities to temporal sovereigns (Bloch, 2015, p. 71). He “secularised” them since the earlier concept of kingship often considered the monarch holy, including the whole royal family which was pre-eminently holy (ibidem, p. 140).

When analysed, the idea of the Divine Rights of Kings can lead to a kind of discord or contradiction. It becomes problematic to criticize the king without committing blasphemy. However, it should not mislead – the empire remains sacred, regardless of the emperor who comes from a people. But then how can the king be anointed by God? Well, a divine seed is spread among the people. The chosen king has the divine seed as well, therefore it can be said that he is indeed anointed by God. Brague describes that attitude as a fable, in which the state is a result of secularisation. The issue of secularisation was introduced by the Church which wanted the State to focus on “its tasks of maintaining the peace” (Mazurkiewicz, 2001, p. 139). Before secularisation, the State remained “divine”. Chester explains that “the ruler [...] stands for Christ, the king of heaven whose body came back from the grave” (Chester, 2016, p. ix). In Byzantium the Emperor’s consecration had the same significance as baptism. The situation was similar with regards to the ‘divinity’ of King Charles V (Kantorowicz, 2016, p. 22–23).

The term “demand for sacrality” explains the strategy used by the emperors. They needed sacrality to legitimate their own laws. If the law was given by God, the importance of the pope could be decreased. It led to the progressive sacralisation of the emperor’s power. Brague clarifies: “the medieval king was not just the receptacle of the holy; he was saturated with holiness to the point of radiating it” (Brague, 2007, p. 140). The political effect of the Divine Right of Kings was nothing else but a horizontal conflict between a “sacred” sovereign and the pope, who was “sacred” as well.

There are two concepts of rulership: Christ-centered and Law-centered. Although the source of this division is quite natural, as the nature of Christ was dual, the way to such a division was long. In 1302 Pope Boniface VIII promulgated the bull “Unam Sanctam” which may be seen as a first anti-secularisation papal document, in which he announced that “whoever resists this power thus ordained by God, resists the ordinance of God [Rom 13:2 – A. L.], unless he invent

like Manicheus two beginnings, which is false and judged by us heretical". As pointed out by Kantorowicz, according to Pope Boniface the character of political bodies is purely functional "within the world community of the corpus mysticum Christi, which was the Church, whose head was Christ, and whose visible head was the vicar of the Christ, the Roman pontiff" (2016, p. 194). That division lays the grounds for the issue of the right to resist tyrannical rulers and unjust rule, proposed by St. Thomas Aquinas. Mazurkiewicz recalls the constitutionalisation of that right derived from the fact that power is not entrusted only to the king but also to government officials as they are also obliged to ensure compliance with the principles of justice and the rights of individuals (2006, p. 282).

The year 1848 seems to be a landmark in the history of the process which denoted the term "secularisation". The revolutions across Europe forced the governments to make some concessions to democratisation. Those who supported these revolutions were often members of different religious minorities, e.g. Protestants in France and Bavaria, Jews, Roman Catholics and Dissenters in Germany (McLeod, 2000, p. 33). That pluralism, in favour of which religious minorities stood, actually launched the contemporary process of secularisation. When people get the possibility of choice, they may be attracted by a competitive system of values or beliefs (*ibidem*, p. 289). The 19th century brought another "threat" to Christianity and an invitation to secularisation: Darwinism (the conception of a Creator God lost its *raison d'être*) and academic criticism of the New Testament (questions about its coherence and inerrancy). It was the beginning of challenging Christian theology by different alternative conceptions and ideas, to mention for example Rudolf Bultmann, Dietrich Bonhoeffer or Friedrich Nietzsche (Turner, 2011, p. 129).

Although the year 1848 can be recognised as the landmark, different processes and patterns of secularisation sprouted before the 19th century. The idea of human perfectibility (social reform and enfranchisement of women) presented by Marquis de Condorcet, as well as the French Enlightenment, personified by Voltaire and Diderot, based on a perception of the Catholic Church as oppressor, formed the contemporary French secularism (*ibidem*, p. 131).

On the contrary, England had Richard Hooker who opted for a widely-understood compromise. He was against treating the Bible "as the only source of our knowledge of God" and indeed this approach contributed to social consensus in the United Kingdom as well as in the United States. Secularists in the French understanding of the term appeared in public life many years later. It was Charles Bradlaugh, the founder of the secular society, mentioned above, who only in 1886 did not take the Oath of Allegiance which was obligatory in order to be sworn in as a member of House of Commons (*ibidem*).

Therefore, from the politological point of view a comparison of British and French trajectories of secularisation seems to confirm that the process of secularisation varies significantly from country to country. The difference resulted primarily due to the British working class which was not dominated by Karl Marx but by John Wesley; by religious pragmatism rather than by ideology (ibidem, p. 130).

The foregoing historical circumstances lend credibility to the argument that the term 'secularisation' cannot adequately or accurately describe the range of processes experienced by different countries. It is no wonder, then, that different scholars present different approaches to secularisation and understand the term differently. From the point of view of Political Science, such variety is not helpful as the all-encompassing term "secularization" does not describe all the patterns of social modernisation, the place of religion in the secular, and the implications for Church-State relations. Since there are different trajectories and patterns of secularisation, the term's meaning is obscured and does not yield a reliable, universal model of its politological consequences. If "secularisation" can be observed practically everywhere in the world, regardless of the historical, cultural, religious and institutional context, the term loses its analytical usefulness. The foregoing brief analysis of secularisation over the years leads to the proposition that the term ought to be supplemented by qualifying prefixes or suffixes which differentiate the various patterns. Concurrently, Church-State relations require a typology which differentiates, describes and labels the various patterns. Having regard to the scholarly definitions reviewed earlier and the foregoing historical sketch, a typology comprising five distinct patterns of "secularisation" is proposed, as follows:

1. Classical secularisation
2. Desecularisation
3. Substantive secularisation
4. Semi-secularisation
5. Quasi-secularisation

The division should not be confused with the modes of Church-State relations, namely: Pure Separation, Hostile Separation, Coordinated Separation (Krukowski, 2000, p. 43–53). It is, however, consistent with them, as long as one of the patterns of secularisation is implicated in the evolution of one of the three models of Church-State relations. However, this article does not analyse the link between different models of secularisation and secular state. Nor does the discussion speculate on the reasons why a particular pattern of secularisation, or a specific mode

of Church-State relations developed. Rather, the remainder of the article outlines the defining characteristics of each of the foregoing patterns of secularisation.

Classical secularisation denotes a process of secularization that fulfills the criteria of the first definition proposed by Burgoński: *a gradual decline of religion in the public sphere* (e.g. frequency, influence and so on). A possible example of a state which has experienced classical secularisation may be the Republic of France, the first modern state to pursue programmatic secularisation over historical time-scales.

Desecularisation describes a situation where in a secularized country, relatively high church attendance can result in *a reversal of the process of secularisation*, namely a gradual increase of religion in the public sphere. A complex definition of desecularisation has been developed by Berger (1999) and systematized by Karpov (2010, p. 232–270). It is also related to the definition of secularisation proposed by Wilson (2016, p. 6). Moreover, Karpov suggests that de-secularisation may be divided itself into different patterns; he also introduces “the Secularization-Desecularization Cycle” (Karpov, 2010, p. 232–270).

Substantive secularisation is a process when *religion is still much in evidence in institutional life but its importance is low*, as is church attendance. The status of the Church results from customs and tradition; however, it does not affect the ongoing classical secularisation of the public institutions. Substantive secularisation can be, therefore, compared to classical secularisation, with the proviso that the religious décor plays an important role in Church-State relations and, indeed, in the legitimation of the State’s secular institutions. The United Kingdom, with its established Church, that is also represented in the Crown and in Parliament, may be an example of this form of secularisation.

Semi-secularisation appears when the process of secularisation is intermittent and uneven. Church attendance remains high and religious tradition, symbols and rituals permeate popular culture. Some important spheres of public and institutional life have been secularised, whilst others, no less important, have remained strongly connected with religion. It cannot be objectively determined, however, whether a particular sphere will remain religious, or, whether it will, eventually, become secularized. A possible example of this form of secularisation may be the Republic of Malta.

Quasi-secularisation is a process in which, while public institutions *de iure* remain secular, religion nonetheless remains very important. Consequently, internal bonds of Church-State relations are strong. The status of Church-State relations, however, is not legally rooted, but, instead, is based on custom and tradition. A possible example of quasi-secularisation may be the Republic of Poland.

An important element which possibly may lead to quasi-secularisation is so-called “friendly separation” (or “coordinated separation”) between Church and State. It is the different than “hostile separation” (Krukowski, 2000, p. 284).

In order to differentiate the respective patterns of secularisation the five indicators proposed by Pollack and Pickel may be used, namely:

1. Existence of a strong legal connection between state and church (2 points)
2. Existence of theological faculties in universities (1 point)
3. Religious education in public schools (2 points)
4. Religious care for persons in military and prison (1 point)
5. Public financial support for the churches (2 points) (Pollack; Pickel, 2000, p. 3–4).

However, the indicators do not appear to be sufficient, as the same number of points can be associated with different patterns. Other indicators of Church-State relations, which have been overlooked by Polack and Pickel, should be included in development of this embryonic typology. They are measures of the internal vitality of the Church which, in turn, could affect its social presence, its influence in the public domain and its relations with the State: four such indicators appear to be significant, namely:

1. Church attendance;
2. Proportion of children attending church schools within the national school population;
3. Percentage of non-governmental organisations that originate in or are associated with the Church;
4. Incidence of religious vocations among adult citizens².

The indicators are connected, to a certain degree, with the Totally Catholic Culture (according to Jamison it is “the world of the parish providing Catholic families with schools, youth clubs, football teams, social clubs etc.” [2017]), but they are also associated with Church-State relations. However, to determine the situation in each country, each case requires further research which could include the use of different socio-mathematical tools. The new indicators would

2 The indicators were identified in the course of consultations with Prof. Edward Warrington from the University of Malta, as part of research conducted at the University of Malta.

need to be associated with appropriate scoring so that different patterns of secularization may be clearly distinguished.

As may be seen from the example of semi-secularisation, which is discussed below, it may be possible to confirm or deny, with the use of different research methods in the social sciences, whether a particular pattern of secularisation exists or not, both in the abstract as well as in the context of a particular country.

SEMI-SECULARISATION: A PRELIMINARY EXPLORATION

Semi-secularisation is posited as a model of secularisation that incorporates elements of different patterns of secularisation with an emphasis on privatisation of religion. The most typical example of semi-secularisation is when on the one hand we observe the process of privatisation of religion, but on the other hand the process is accompanied by strong participation in religious practices. In other words, there might be a discrepancy between the teaching of the Church and the private views of its members; however, it does not seriously affect religious identity and religious practices, which remain at a high level. The discrepancy may be visible both on the personal level as well as on the State level. In the case of the State, some elements of its policy might be perceived as characterised by anticlericalism. On the other hand, the State may maintain strong bonds with the Church, and not only because of common interests. This leads to some ambivalence. Since the definition of secularisation proposed by Berger does not apply to the situation when the cultural aspect of secularisation is missing, the term semi-secularisation seems to properly fill the gap.

Semi-secularisation appears when a community of people which is being secularised still remains attached to certain religious roots. The process does emphasise personal experience of the common faith (privatisation of religion) which is related to the past. Nonetheless, it is still deep-rooted in tradition and engenders a sense of community. Commitment to Catholic doctrine remains a key element of semi-secularisation, although that aspect gradually loses its importance somewhat. In other words, due to the process of semi-secularisation, deprivatisation has lost its significance as the privatised religion still plays an important role in public life.

Some elements specific to semi-secularisation may be distinguished, namely:

1. Partial privatisation of religion,
2. Ambivalence towards religion,
3. Peculiar attachment to certain religious roots, such as Catholic culture and religious functions,
4. A succession of political regimes in which religion plays a determining role over centuries
5. A national identity imbued with religious narrative, symbols, tradition and ritual; the nation and the religious community are virtually co-terminous.

These elements are not, however, the indicators but possible results of semi-secularisation. They were observed by the author during a study visit in the Republic of Malta. As noted by Baldacchino, “one could, of course, argue that despite being classified as a Western Democracy the Maltese state and society are still quintessentially pre-modern – not so much because they are so overwhelmingly religious [...] but because they have failed (at least in terms of modernist, secularist goals), to properly vacate religion from autonomous public spheres. This lack of separation is [...] coupled with a persistent paleo-Durkheimian porosity between the sacred and the everyday” (Baldacchino, 2010, p. 130).

The listed elements must, however, be confirmed in a separate study, in which they shall be confronted with the respective indicators and an appropriate methodology. This should be analysed in the context of the existing political system of a particular country. Having the full picture of Church-State relations under a political system, we will be able to recognize and confirm the characteristics of semi-secularisation.

Semi-secularisation is, therefore, posited as a distinctive pattern within the range of patterns encompassed by the term “secularisation”. One dimension of semi-secularisation is a certain sequence of political systems without which the process probably would not come into being. This, however, needs to be confirmed in the separate study of the politological reasons inducing semi-secularisation.

In summary, this article argues that the absence of a single, commonly accepted definition of “secularisation” suggests that the term attempts to embody not one, but a variety of distinctive patterns of the phenomenon; thus, the analyt-

ical and descriptive power of the term is weakened or lost altogether. By sifting through and classifying the range of definitions and theories of secularisation, and examining aspects of the historical development of the phenomenon in the Latin West, it is possible to propose a typology comprising five different patterns of the phenomenon. The validity of the typology must be tested empirically, with a view to establishing (a) the defining characteristics of each pattern; (b) the play of political, religious, cultural and institutional forces which determine the trajectory of secularisation in different countries; and (c) the influence of a specific pattern on the mode of Church-State relations evolving in particular historical contexts. A pilot study conducted over the course of several months in the Republic of Malta suggests emphatically that such empirical validation is possible for what is here provisionally labelled "semi-secularisation" and, by extension, for the other patterns in the typology.

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SECULARIZATION AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS: TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY

SUMMARY

The article titled *Secularization and Church-State Relations: Towards a Typology* is an attempt to address the lack of clear definition of the term “secularisation”. The paper is divided into four parts. In the beginning, the author, taking into account previous research, compiles various concepts of origin and the meaning of the term „secularisation”, including authors such as Berger, Casanova, Taylor and Mazurkiewicz.

The second part presents different attitudes towards secularisation and secularism. It also explains differences between the two concepts.

Moving on to the third section of the paper, the author here includes selected historical aspects of secularisation and the influence of this process on the state-church relationship. A historical analysis is followed by a new typology of secularisation, consisting of five different categories which are possible to apply in Political Science.

In the last part of the article a preliminary attempt to analyze the term „semi-secularization” is carried out. In his research, the author outlines the elements that make up that process.

The absence of a single, commonly accepted definition of ‘secularisation’ suggests that the term attempts to embody not one, but a variety of distinctive patterns of the phenomenon; thus, the analytical and descriptive power of the term is weakened or lost altogether. By sifting through and classifying the range of definitions and theories of secularisation, while also examining aspects of the historical phenomenon development within the Latin West, it is possible to propose a typology comprising five different patterns of this phenomenon.